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BRoxns-OwE's RIGHT To TRMINATE AN ExCLUSiV

SAE CONTRAcT

INDmNrTE Pau6o.-The defendant contracted to give the plaintiff the
exclusive sale of his property, but no time limit was placed on the contract.
A few weeks later the defendant sold the property to a customer procured
through his own efforts. The plaintiff claims the commission specified in
the contract of exclusive sale. Held: The plaintiff can recover, as the defendant had no right to terminate the contract before the expiration of a
reasonable time. Harris v. McPherson et al., i15 AtL 723 (Conn. xga=).
The general rule seems to be that where the broker has no right of exclusive sale and an indefinite period within which to sell the property, the
owner does not deprive himself of his right to sell the property. Hilling v.
Darby, 71 Kan. Io7, 79 Par. 1013 (1905). Where the owner has given the
broker the right of an exclusive sale for a definite period of time, many
jurisdictions hold that the owner merely gives up his right to appoint another broker during the stipulated period, but that he does not give up his
own right of making a sale. Dale v. Sherwood, 41 Mimi. 535, 43 N. W. 569
(1889) ; Turner v. Baker, 225 Pa. 359, 74 Atl. 172 (igo9). On the other
hand, it has been held that the right of exclusive sale being in the broke.
for a definite period of time subjects the owner to liability for breach of
contract where he himself makes the sale during the life of the contract.
Carter v. Hall, 19t Ky. 75, 229 S. W. 132 (1920). The next phase of the
question that presents itself is where the owner gives an exclusive right of sale
for an indefinite period of time. Under these facts it is generally held
"unless the contract of employment is coupled with an interest or given
for a valuable consideration, the principal has the right in good faith
to revoke the agency at will, at any time before the broker finds a purchaser." Smith v. Kimball, 193 Mass. 58 79 N. E. 8o (19o7); Anderson
In one case the court intiv. Shaffer, 87 Kan. 36, z24 Pac. 423 (1912).
mated in a dictum that the owner cannot revoke the agency before the lapse
of a reasonable time, but did not decide the question definitely. Alexander
v. Sherwood Co., 72 W. Va. 195, 77 S. E. xo27 (1913). The contention that
a broker is entitled to a reasonable time where he has an exclusive right
of sale for an indefinite period has been expressly denied in a number of
cases. Kelly v. Marshall, 172 Pa. 396, 33 Atl. 69o (1896); O'Hara v. Murray, x44 N. Y. App. z13, z28 N. Y. Supp. ioog (i91i). The last named
cases seem to represent the weight of authority and are directly contra to
the principal case. It seems unreasonable to hold that the mere addition of
the word "exclusive" should deprive the owner of his inherent right to
sell his property without a special agreement to the contrary. It is therefore
submitted that the court erred in its holding in the principal case.
ywm

CHATTL MORTGAGE--IEX

OF REPAIRMAN

SUPERIOR TO A PRIOR MoRT-

repairs
made and the repairman retained possession of the automobile claiming
GAGE LzEN.-The mortgagor in possession of an automobile had
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that his lien fcr repairs was superior to a prior recorded chattel mortiage.
Held: The lien of the artisan for repairs to a chattel, made at the request
of the legal possessor, was superior to a prior recorded chattel mortgage.
Johnson v. Yates, iio S. F.. 6o3 (N. C. 922).
A mechanic's lien for repairs made to a chattel at the request of the
mortgagor is subordinate to a prior recorded chattel mortgage provided the
lien claimant had actual or constructive votice of the prior chattel mortgage Denison v. Shuler, 47 Mich. 598, 11 N. V. 4oo (i88z); Holt v. Schwar;
225 S. W. 856 (Tex. i92o); Nesbitt Auto Co. v. WVhitlo-c, 113 S. C. 519, 101
S. E. 8=a (i92o). Likewise a warehouseman's lien does not take precedence
over a prior recorded chattel mortgage. Storm v. Smith, 137 Mass. 2o1
(1884); Werner Bros. Exp. and Storage Co. v. Donovan, 2D6 IIl. App. is
(1918). Under Statutes giving a lien to a livery-stable keeper, such liens are
subordinate to prior recorded chattel mortgages. Howes v. Newcomb, x46
Mass. 76 (x888); National Bank v. Jones, 18 Okla. 555, 91 Pac. x9i (19o7).
Since the mortgagor is not the agent of the mortgagee, the lien claimant
is in no better position than a subsequent mortgagee, Sargent v. Usher, 55 N.
H. 287 (i875); Lee v. Van Meter, 98 Ky.1, 32 S. W. 137 (1895); and to allow the mortgagor to displace the mortgagees prior lien would be an unjust violation of property rights. Howes v. Newcomb, supra. Pickett v.
McCord, 62 Mo. App. 467 (1895).
Where the prior mortgagee consents to have the work done, then the subsequent lien is superior. Lynde v. Parker, 15S Mass. 481, 3o N. E. 74 (z8)2.
Johanns v. Ficke, 2Z4 N. Y. 513, 121L
F. 358 (t918). And where the mortgagor has the use of the chattel, it has been heMd that this amounts to an
implied assent by the mortgagee for the mortgag6r to have repairs done, and
that therefore the repairman's lien is superior to the prior chattel mortgage.
Barrett Mfg. Co. v. Van Ronk, 212 N. Y. 9o, io5 N. E. Sx (x914). Reeves
& Co. v. Russell, 28 N. D. 265, T48 N. W. 6 s. (i9'4); Mortgage Securities
Co. v. Pfaffman, x77 Cal. xog, x69 Pac. i033 (1917).
The principal case follows the minority view and seems unsound for the
reason that it makes it possible for the mortgagor to render worthless the
security of the mortgagee, and is thereby an unjust violation of property
rights.
CoNsmmoNAL Lw-VLmrrY OF NEw YoRK RiXT LAws Acmr UiEELmm-A New York statute allows a tenant to hold over after the expiration
of his lease and to have a "reasonable" rent determined by a commission as
the basis of payment, irrespective of any agreement or contract between the
parties. Held: The Act is constitutional. Edgar A. Levy Leasing Co v.
Siegal, 42 U. S. Sup. Ct. 289 (19n).
This case again affirms the -onstitulionality of the so-called "Emergency
Ren, Laws." The New York act had been declared constitutional in Marcto
Brown Holding Co. v. Feldman, 256 U. S. 170, 41 Sup. Ct. 465 (1921); the
District of Columbia Act in Block v. Hirsh, 256 U. S. 135, 41 Sup. C. 458
(192').
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The principal case does not stress the emergency feature of the statute, to
the extent that the prior decisions had done so. It affirms the principle that
there is no impairment of the obligation of contracts, since the leases were
made subject to a valid exercise of the state's police power.
The basis of rent charge is a "reasonable" rent. This the court held was
a valid and enforceable standard. The Lever Act (c. ca, 4o Stat. 276) provided for the criminal prosecution of persons selling food at "unreasonable
prices. In U. S. v. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U. S. 8i (io2i) the court held
such a standard vague and unconstitutional. In the principal case the court
distinguishes the case on the ground that the Lever Act involved criminal
prosecutions.
With this case the constitutionality of the Rent laws seems firmly established. In this connlction see, "The Police Power and the New York Rent
Laws," by George W. Wickersham, 69 U. oF PA. LAw REvmw, 3oz; als, a
note in 7o U. o PA. LAw Rvmw 4.

DAmAs---ExcEssmVE DAuAoGs-NEw TanL-In an action for damages
for an injury to the knee, which partially incapacitated the plaintiff, the jury
awarded the plainiff $x9,s25 damages. The interest from this amount exceeded the earning capacity of the plaintiff prior to the injury. The trial
court refused a new trial or a remittitur. Held: A new trial be granted. Gall
v. Philadelphia, 27a Pa. - (9=).
The action of a trial court in granting or denying a motion for a new
trial on the grounid that the damages are excessive, is within the sound discretion of the court. Edwards v. Wiley, 218 Mass. 363, io5 N. . 986 (19t4):
Devine v. St. Louis, 257 Mo. 470, 165 S. W. 1o4 (1914); Dunlap v. Pittsburgh R. R., 247 Pa. 23o, 93 AtL 276 (i915). When a verdict has been approved by the trial court, appellate courts do not often disturb it. Yet if it
is clear that there is no evidence or basis on which the amount allowed could
properly have been awarded, an appellate court will set the verdict aside. Consolidated Grocery Co. v. Allman, 59 Fla. 23o, 5i South. 928 (Igxo)*; Kickhoefer
v. Hidershide, io4 Wis. 126; So N. W. 62 (1899) ; Birmingham R. R. v. Coleman, x81 Ala. 478, 61 South. So (x913). It is within this class of cases that
the principal case falls.
Some courts, where excessive damages have been awarded, affirm the
judgment, conditioned upon the plaintiff agreeing to a specified remittitur.
FMinch v. Northern Pacific R. R., 47 Minn. 36, 49 N. W. 329 (i8gi); Norther Chicago R. P. v. Wrixon, iSo Ill.3, 37 N.E. 895 (1894). Only a few
courts have extended this principle to a compulsory remittitur, compelling
the plaintiff to accept a less amount and denying him the alternative of a new
trial. Rice v. Crescent City R. R. St La. Ann. xo8, 24 South. 791 (x899);
Wichita & Colorado R. R. v. Gibbs, 47 Kam 2,4, 27 Par. 99i (x89i). The
United States Supreme Court has held that such a decree in a tort action violates the constitutional guaranty of trial by jury in Federal courts. Kennon
v. Gilmer, 131 U. S. A, 33 L Ed. nio (1888).
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The principal case falb within the class of cases, as indicated above,
where the appellate court will set aside an excessive verdict if there is no
evidence upon which the amount could have been properly awarded. As such,
it is in accord with general authority.
DIRECT CO-rxsmT-AccusAsox o JuowE r RaaT or GRAND Juity Nor
Pprvitam-n a report by the grand jury, charges were made that the presidig judge, to whom the report was submitted in open court, was guilty of
conspiring to protect criminals, and a recommendation was added thereto that
the said judge resign from his office. The grand jurors were each fined for
contempt of court and an appeal was taken. Held: The court may punish a
grand juror for an act which amounts to contempt, regardless of his intention. Also, the report of a grand jury which goes beyond its constituted authority is not privileged. Coons v. State, z34 N. F_. z94 (Ind. ipan).
Direct contempt may consist of words or acts in the presence of the
court, intimating that the judge is unfair. Field v. Thornell, x06 Iowa 7, 75
N. W. 685 (r89); Mahoney v. State, 33 Ind. App. ;5, 72 N. F_. xst (z9o4).
An attorney may be in contempt for stating in a brief or otherwise that the
court had improper motives in making certain decisions, and this even though
there was no intention to be in contempt. Er tarte Smith, 28 Ind. 47 (1867);
In re Chartz, 29 Nev. 11o, 8 5 Pac. 352 (x9o6). A grand juror although not A
part of the court, is an appendage thereto, and his.position would seem to be
analogous to that of an attorney.
Where the grand jury in a report to the district court made a statement
concerning the misconduct of a public official, such statement, being beyond
the scope of the duties of the grand jury, was held not to be privileged, and
the grand jurors were held liable in actions of libel. Bennett v. Stockwell,
197 Mich. 5o, 163 N. W. 482 (1917); Poston v. Washington A. & Mt. V. R.
Co., 36 D. of C. App. Cas. 359 (igix). Although admitting that such a statement was not absolutely privileged, such a report has a qualified privilege
and there cannot ba a recovery in an action for libel unless the jurors acted
with malice and in bad faith. Rector v. Smith, ix Iowa 3wo (i86o). Tie
question of privilege would seem to be the same in an action involving contempt and an action based on libel, and in libel actions the weight of modern
authority denies even a qualified privilege where the grand jury acts'beyond
the scope of its authority.
In the principal case the grand jury acted under a purely statutory authority, which they clearly exceeded; consequently their report was not privileged in any way. It was an act of contempt committed in open court, and the
weight of decided authority is that such an act is direct contempt even without any intention. The case is one of first impression, and although the decision seems to be severe, it is logical and in accord with analogous decisions.

ELEcios-PiROman' QtrAwrcAkoN oF Vm's--CoNMTcr TO PURMCA.
LAxv.-A, who was in possession of land under a contract to purchase,-voted
at an election of a director of a water district. The election was contested
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on the ground that A was not qualified to vote under Wash. Rev. Code 1915,
par. 6418, which entitles any person to vote ... . who holds title to land or
evidence of title to land...."
Held: A was entitled to vote. State es teL
Holt v. Hamilton, 202 Pac. 971 (Wash. ig2z).
The doctrine of the principal case was applied in the case of State ex reL.
Dillman v. Weide, 29 S. D. 1o, 135 N. W. 696 (Igi2), where the statute
allowed legal freeholders to vote, and the coxrt held that a person in possession of land Vider a contract to purchase had the equitable estate and Vas a
freeholder. Two other cases, where a man had to be freeholder to be a
juror, allowed persons having equitable estates to serve. New Orleans, etc.
Ry. Co. v. Hemphlill, 3s Miss. 17 (185) ; State v. Ragland, 75 N. C. 12 (1876).
A different rule, however, is followed in Directors of Fallbrook, etc. v.
Abia, mo6 Cal. 355 39 c. 794 (1895), where a person in possession under a
contract to purchiase was held not entitled to vote as a "freeholder owning
land." Also in 1* re the Realty Voters, i9 R. I. 387 (x898), and in Perry v.
Morley, x6 British Columbia 91 (Canada 1911), the equitable owner of land
was held not tQ be an owner within the statutes specifying that voters must
be "owners of land." A grantee of a deed in escrow who was in possession
of the land was held not entitled to vote as an owner in Hull v. Sangamon
River Drainage Districtw IIL 454, 76 N. E. 7ox (wgo6). The rule in England, which is that a person must be a legal and not an equitable owner in
order to vote, was laid down in early cases. Jackson's Case, 2 Luder's Election Cases 427 (Eng. z785); Freshwater's Case, 2 Luder's Election Cases 54o
(1785); also the rule is laid down in Heywood, County Elections 65.
In the principal case the court said that the words in the statute, "evidence of title," were intended by the legislature to allow persons to vote who
had written evidence of their right to acquire title. It is submitted that "evidence of title" and evidence" of right to acquire title are not the same thing,
and it is difficult to see how the court reached its conclusion by this reasoning. If, however, the court was correct in its conclusion that the two are the
same, then unde the statute two persons would be able to vote on the same
land namely, th. person having title, and the person having a contract to purchase.
EvnaNc,-- Lw GssrA-LosS or ARncL Aox.-The appellant was convicted of the murder of a detective who was shot and rendered speechless for
twenty or thirty minutes after the shooting. As soon as he could speak, he
made a statemeq t that a stranger shot him. He died about ten minutes later.
Held: This statement was admissible as part of the re$ gesea. Commonwealth v. Puntario, appellant, 271 Pa. 5ox (xg2).
It is well settled that statements made with respect to an act and contemporaneous therewith are admissible as part of -the res gesae. Wetmore
v. Mel, x Ohio 26 (r85r); Trenton Passenger Ry. Co. v. Cooper, 6o N. J. L.
219, 37 Atl. 730 (1897); Lewis' Adm'r. v. Bowling Green Gas Light Co.,
135 Ky. 6x1, 117 S. W. 228 (1909).
Statements made immediately after the act has occurred so as to raise
a reasonable presumption that the words spoken were spontaneous and not
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induced by reflection or deliberation are also generally admitted as part of

the rets get'.

Bowles v. Commonwealth, 1o3 Va. 8M, 48 S. E. 5ay (1904);

People v. Leonardo, gg N. Y. 432, 92 N. F.. io6o (xgio); Palmer v. State,'
187 Pac. 5o2 (OkLa. 19m); State v. Dougherty, 228 S. W. 786 (Mo. 192i).
In England, the expression ret genste appears to be more restricted, and
includes only such facts or statements as are connected with the fact under
investigation so as to be a part of it. Thompson v. Trevanion, Skinner 4o2
(Eng. 1693); Regina v. Foster, 6 C. & P. 325 (Eng. 1834). This restriction
was particularly emphasized in Regina v. Bzdingfield, 14 Cox Cr. C. 341 (Frg.

18n9).
As to the admissibility of statements made by the injured party immediately upon his regaining consciousness there seems to be a conflict. Such
statements were admitted as part of the ret gene in Christopherson v. Railway Co, 135 Iowa 409, zog N. W. io77 (3907), and Britton v. Washington
Water Power Co., 59 Wash. 440, I1 Pac. 20 (xgio). In these cases the test
was held to be spontaneity, and lack of deliberation. Such statements were
held inadmissible, however, in Rogers v. State, 88 Ark. 433, z15 S. W. z56
(1908), and Bionto v. Illinois Central Ry. Co, 125 La. 147, 51 So. 98 (1gto).
In the latter cases, the courts seem to have adhered to the more restricted
English view.
The spontaneity test seems to be a growing one in this country and appears to be the basis for the admission of statements made by a party as
soon as he has recovered from some serious shock or suffering that has impaired his power of speech. Commonwealth v. Werntz, z61 Pa. 591, 29 AtL
272 (z894) ; Eby v. Travelers Ins. Co., 238 Pa. 525, io2 AtL 209 (1917). In
Waldele v. N. Y. C. & H. R. Ry. Co. 9s N. Y.'274 (884), however, the
English view was followed and the communication of a deaf-mute injured in
an accident, made to his brother, also a deaf-mute, half an hour after the
accident and at the place where it occurred was held indmissible.
The statement in the principal case, regarded from the standpoint of
spontaneity, meets the test. It seems almost incredible that one under such
circumstances could form any plan during the time in which he could not
speak, even though he were conscious until the moment he died.

FALsz IMPRISONMENT-AGENCY ix ARREST HE.D ra JuRY.-7The local
agent of the defendant company was instrumental in ca'using the arrest and
imprisonment of the plaintiff for stealing an automobile insured by defendant.
Held: It was proper for the court to submit to the jury the question whether
or not the agent acted within the scope of his employment, although the facts
on this point were undisputed. Hines v. Fireman's Fund Insurance Co.
et al., 235 S. W. 174 (Mo. 1921).
The courts of some states hold that when the facts are undisputed,
whether an agent's act was within the scope of his employment is always a
question of law which the court must decide. Gulich and Holmes v. Grover,
33 N. J. L. 463 (868) ; Hall v. Passaic Water Co., 83 N. 3. L 77, 8S AtL
349 (1912); Doggett v. Greene, 254 IIl. 135 (191a).
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But the better view is that it is a question for the jury except where not
only are the facts undisputed but only one inference can fairly and reasonably be drawn from them. 2 Corpus Juris 961; Meechem, Agency, 2d Ed.,
Sees. 5o and -r982; South Bend Toy Manufacturing Co. v. Dakota F. & -M.
Insurance COc.3 S. D. 20S (1892).
It is difficult to see how the implied powers of a local insurance agent
can be so extensive as to include the power of arresting one suspected of
having stolen goods insured by the insurance company. In Larson v. Fidelity
Life Association, 71 Minn. 101 (1898), a sub-agent sued the insurance company for false arrest and malicious prosecution on a charge of embezzling
defendant's funds. The action had been brought aginst the plaintiff and his
arrest caused by the defendant's local agent. The court held the defendant
not liable and said that although in this case the local agent might have acted
to protect himse.. from loss, even if he acted solely in his principal's interest, it was beyapd the scope of his employment. Also in. Mathews v. The
Insurance Co., 64 IlL App. 28o (i896), the defendant company was held not
liable for the trespasses of its agents on the destroyed property in furtherance of the defe.ldant's business, the court believing that the agent's acts were
beyond the scopq of their authority.
The only fair and reasonable inference that can be drawn in the principal
case seems to be that the local agent was not within the scope of his employment in obtining the plaintiffs arrest and imprisonment, even though by
such acts he maX possibly have been attempting to recover the automobile.
The facts being undisputed, if this inference only can fairly and reasonably
be drawn, the court should have decided as a question of law that the defendant was nol liable.
HOMICDE--SPmNG Guxs.-The defendant, to protect his property and
not his life, set; spring gun in an unoccupied house intending to kill anyone
who broke in aqd entered. The deceased who was killed by the gun entered
merely out of c.riosity. The jury found a verdict of manslaughter. Held:
No error. Self-defense is not available as a defense. State v. Green, zio
S. E. 145 (S. C. 1921).
According to the earlier common law, the setting of a spring gun was
not in itself unlawful, and if a person was killed by it while attempting a
felony, no crimm.l liability is; incurred. 13 R. C. L,, sec. '55; Deane v.
Clayton, 2,Taun. 489 (Eng. 1817); Hott v. Wilkes, 3 Barn. & Ald. 304 (Eng.
z82o). But, except in the case of dwelling houses, this rule has been changed
in England by the Statutes of 14 & 15 Vict c. 19, S. 4 and 54 & 55 Vict. c.6
s. x. One reason advanced by the English courts for the rule was that the
attempted felonies were themselves punishable by death. This does not apply
to the United States, however, where few felonies are so punishable. And
the later American cases hold that if a homicide results from the discharge
of a spring gun the person setting the gun is liable to indictment for murder
or manslaughter, on the ground that life may be taken only in the protection and
preservation of life and not where mere property rights are at stake. Simpson v. State, s9 Ala. 1, i Alm. Rep. i (iB"7); State v. Marfaudille, 48 Wash.
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117, 92 Pac. 939, 14 L. R. A. (N. S. 19o7). A few courts have held it lawful
to set spring guns to prevent burglary even of a warehouse or shop, Gray v.
Combs, 7 J. J. Marsh. 478 (Ky. 1832); State v. Moore, 31 Conn. 479 (1863);
but this view has been expressly disapproved in State v. Barr, i Wash. 481,
29 L. R. A. i54 (1895), where, however, the court said that there might be an
exception in the case of dwelling houses due to the danger to the lives of the
inmates.
The defendant in the principal case was in no danger of losing his life
or receiving serious bodily injury, his purpose was merely that of protecting
his property, not his life, and since the house was unoccupied he was clearly
indictable either under the American rule or the English rule as changed by
Statute.
INFANTs-RIGHT TO RECOVER FOR PNATAL IHjuRY.-The plaintiff was
injured eleven days before birth through the defendant's negligence. Held:
The plaintiff has no right of action because he was not in existence as a
being at the time of the injury. Drobner v. Peters, 133 N. E. 567 (N. Y.

1921).

A child en ventre sa mere has generally been accorded property and inheritance rights as if he were actually born. He may inherit under a will or
laws of descent and he may have an injunction and a gurdian. Biggs v.
McCarthy, 86 Ind. 352 (1882); McArthur v. Scott, 113 U. S. 34A, 28 Law Fd.
1oi5 (1885) ; Deal v. Sexton, 144 N. C. 157, s6 S. E. 69 (19o7) ; i BL Comm.
xx8 (Lewis' Ed. ixoa). He has also the statutory right to sue for the death
of a parent caused by another although the parent died before the cluld'S
birth. The George and Richard (Eng. i87z) 24 Law Times 717; Texas and
Pacific R. Co. v. Robertson, 82 Texas 657, 17 S. W. 1041 (1891).

When-

ever it is for his benefit a child ex ventre sa mere is considered as born. Doe
v. Clarke, 2 H. BI. 399, x26 Eng. Rep. R. 617 (1795).
Notwithstanding these rights children are generally held to be incapable
of suing for injuries to their persons suffered before birth. The rule that
for all purposes beneficial a child ex ventre sa mere is in being has not been
extended beyond the property rights of such a child. Walker v. Great
Northern Railway Co., 28 L. R.. 69 (Ir. i89i); Dietrich v. Northampton, 138
Mass.. 14 (1884); Allaire v. St. Luke's Hospital, 184 IlL 359, 56 N. F_. 638
(i90o); Gorman v. Budlong, 23 R. I. 69, 49 AtL ;o4 ('9o); Bud v. United
Railways Co, 248 Mo. 126, i54 S. W. 7i (1913). In Nugent v. Brooklyn
Heights R. Co, x39 N. Y. S. 367 (1913) a child en ventre To mere was recognized as an entity capable of suing for a tort and O'Brien, C. J., in Walker
v. Great Northern Railway Co. jupra left the point open in case of a wilful
tort.
Recovery has been refused because the injury occurred at such an early
period of gestation that the child could not at that time have been born capable of living, leaving the case of a child that could be born viable undecided. Lipps v. Milwaukee Electric Railway Co., 164 Wis. 272, i59 N. W. 916
(1916). This distinction is not drawn where the property rigbts of an unborn child are involved. Harper v. Archer 12 Miss. 99 (t845), but in order
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to insure proper proof of the cause of injury it would be reasonable to hold
that a child becomes a person able to sue for torts to itself when it can be
born viable. 26 Yale'Law Journal 318 (1917).
The inability of a child to recover for prenatal injuries works an extreme hardship; it is an instance of an injury for which there can be no recovery. The mother cannot recover for the lifelong suffering under which
the child must labor. Prescott v. Robinson, 74 N. H. 46o, 69 At. 522 (xg8),
Nugent v. Brooklyn Heights R. Co., "p.
The decision in the principal case follows an almost unanimous lin. of
authorities. These cases beginning with Dietrich v. Northampton, upra, base
their decisions upon the fact that there are no previous cases in the common
law which allow an infant to recover for injuries suffered in its mother's
womb. It is submitted, however, that in view of the property rights accorded such a child in the common law, it would have been logical, to recognize the persoal rights of the child. If the incidents to a living entity are
recognized, the entity itself should be. It appears that the courts have overlooked the principles of the common law in their search for strict precedent.
Nugent v. Brooklyn Heights R. Co. supra.
PA cc - uDGmzr NOTWIThSTANDING THE Vuicr.- The plaintiff
sued on a promissory'note. There was no motion for a directed verdict by
either party. The jury brought in a verdict in favor of the defendant and the
plaintiff moved for a judgment x. o. v. The trial court ordered judgment for
the plaintiff on his motion and the defendant appealed. Held: Judgment x. o. v.
can be ordered by the court on motion of either of the parties, even though
no motion had previously been made for a directed verdict. Merchants'
State Bank of Velva v. Streeper. 186 N. W. 98 (N. D. 1921)
At common law the plintiff'could on motion obtain a judgment rn. o. v.
where the defendant had put in a plea in confession and avoidance which was
insufficient in law to constitute a defense, on the theory that the issues settled by the verdict were wholly immaterial.L Slocum v. N. Y. Life Insurance

C, 28 U. S.64 (19T3) ; Hurt v. Ford, 42 Mo. 28,36 S. W. 671 (1897).
The rule has been generally relaxed either by statute or judicial interpretation so that in most states today either party can obtain such a judgment.
Beaver v. Bower, 24 Ky. 882, 7o S. W. z95 (igoo) ; Irk v. Salt Lake City, 32
Utah x43, 89 Pac. 458 semble, (x9o7) ; McCoy v. Jones, 61 Ohio i19, 55 N. E.
219 (1899).
Most courts limit the scope of such a judgment to defective
pleadings, Hurt v. Ford, supra, and some states have expressly so limited it
by statute, Beavet v. Bower, supra, McCoy v. Jones supra. However in a few
jurisdictions statutes have been passed permitting either party to obtain such
a judgment where on all the evidence that person is clearly so entitled.
Cruickshank v. St. Paul F. & M. Ins. Co, 75 Mi a66, 77 N. W. 958 (z899);
Aetna Indemnity CD. v. Schroeder, 12 N. D. 11o, 95 N. W. 436 (z9o3); Dalmas v. Kemble, 215 Pa. 410, 64 AtL 599 (igo6). In Minnesota and Pennsylvania under their respective statutes the courts have held that a judgment
n. o. v. can only be entered where the party making the motion had previously
asked the court to direct a verdict. Fleisher v. St. Paul Apartment House
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Company, 186 N. W.

232 (Minn. 1922); American Car & Foundry Co. Y
Alexandria Water Co, 221 Pa. 529, 7o At. 867 (z09o).
The North Dakota statute, under which the principal case was decided,
was taken verbatim from the statute in Minnesota, Richmire v. Andrews Elevator Co., 1i N. D. 453, 92 N. AV. 819 (z9o2), and in express terms provides
that a judgment %.o. v. might be entered where at the close of the testimony
a motion had been made "by either party to the suit requesting the trial court
to direct a verdict in favor of the party making such a motion,* which request was refused. The case would seem to be contrary to the express words
of the statute, and under this decision the rule is different in North Dakota
from that in force in other states having similar statutes.
RAILROADs-COsNaiauToRY NEGLIGENCE OF AuTo

DRIvER AT Caosswr0BLE

iNG.-DuTY To LooiC AND LisrE.-The plaintiff in driving his automobile over
the railroad crossing looked in one direction and relied upon Lewis, a passenger seated beside him to look in the other. The plaintiffs automobi was
struck by the defendant's engine which approached from the direction In
which the passenger was keeping watch. Held: the plaintiff is guilty of contributory negligence and cannot recover, the duty to look and listen being one
which cannot be delegated to a passenger. State ex reL Hines v. Bland, 2V
S. W. =os8 (Mo. Feb. 1922).
There is no unanimity of the courts as to what acts of caution and observance are required of an automobile driver crossing railroad tracks, so as
to relieve him from contributory negligence.
The more liberal view and the more logical it appears is to require of him
such care and prudence as an ordinarily prudent.man would exercise under
like circumstances, including the use of his faculties of sight and hearing.
Pendroy v. Great Northern R. Co., 17 N. D. 433, 117 N. W. 53t (1908);
Dickinson v. Erie R. Co, 81 N. J. L. 464, 81 AtL. o4 (9ri); Nicoll v. Oregon-Washington R. Co., 71 Wash. 4o9, xz8 Pac. 628 (1912).
The principal case it seems, however, represents a more stringent view
which holds that there is a positive duty to exercise those sense facultiesto look and listen-and failure to do so is of itself contributory negligence.
Kelsay v. Missouri-Pacific R. Co., i29 Mo. .36, 3o S. W. 339 (z89S); Gray v.
Chicago R. Co., 5s Ill. App. 428 (ipso); Chase v. New York Central R. Co.
2a8 Mass. 137, 94 N. E. 377 (91).
Other courts have gone still further and have imposed a duty not only
to look and listen but to stop as well. Brommer v. Penna. R. Co., z79 Fred.
577, 103 C. C. A. T35 (ipso); Bush v. Phila. & R. R. Co., 23 Pa. 327, 8
Atlantic Coast Line . Co. v. Weir, 63 Fla. 69, 58 So. 64t
Atl. 409 (11i9);
(1912).

Most exacting of all is the rule, as laid by the Pennsylvania Courts, which
requires te driver not only to stop, look and listen, but in addition, where
the view i3 obstructed, to alight from his vehicle and go forward to a point
where he can see. Lehigh Valley R. Co. v. Brandtmaier, .113 Pa. 6fot 6 Atl.
238 (1886); Kinter v. Penna. R. Co., 2o4 Pa. 497, s4 At. 276 (iso3); Bistider
v. Lehigh Valley R. Co, 224 Pa. 65, 73 At. 940 (ipo9).
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This principle has met with little favor outside of Pennsylvania, how.
ever, it being generally held that no such extra duty is imposed upon the
traveler. Kelly v. St. Paul R. Co. 29 Minn. x, xx N. W. 67 (i88x); Georgia
P. R. Co. v. Lee, 92 Ala. 262, 9 So. 23o (i8go); Vance v. Atchison R. CoD,9
Cat App. 2o, 98 PaC. 41 (1908)-.
To rule at all that the failure to stop, look and listen constitutes contributory negligence per se, it is submitted, is both unfair and illogical; if the
plaintiff exercises ordinary care such as a prudent man would use, that should
be enough, Pendroy v. Great Northern R. Co., supra. If he is careful by
looking in one direction and relying upon a passenger to watch in the other,
as the plaintiff in the principal case did, he should not be precluded from recovery.
The courts, it appears, in the penurious infancy of the American railroads, desired to give them the widest protection, in order to encourage
their development and hence the inflexible stop, look and listen dogma. Now
that the railroad.s have grown up, however, it seems that the rule may very
well be discarded
SAms-CtrOs.io.u SA.---REsEavATIoN or Ti.L-The vendor of gas
casing and pipe, expressly stipulated in his contract of sale that title should
not pass to the vendee until certain notes given for the unpaid remainder of
the purchase price were paid. Held: The title vested in the vendee at the
time of the transaction and the vendor, his sale unrecorded, cannot recover
the goods from i subsequent mortgagee of record. Tague v. Guaranty State
Bank of Drumdght, =oz Pac. 510 (OkL iq2z).
Where theri is in a contract of sale an express reservation of title in the
vendor, until the full purchase price is paid, it is generally held that title does
not pass until that condition" is performed. Burnett v. Pritchard, 2 Pick. $12
(Mass. t824) ; lAarkness v. Russell, iz8 U. S. 663, 3o L. ed. 285 (x886) ; Bundage v. Columbus Machine Co., i43 Mich. ro, io6 N. W. 397 (zo6). Even
where there is such reservation of title, however, it is often difficult, the courts
have admitted, to determine just what the parties intended; whether they intended to make k completed sale giving to the vendor a mortgage on the property for the payment of the purchase price or whether the transaction was
intended as a sale on condition. The H. C. Grady, 87 Fed. 232 (i8) ; Studebaker Bros. Co. v. Man, 13 Wyo. 358, So Pac. x5ir (zo4). This intention must
be gathered, as in the construction of all contracts, not only from the language of the paries but from their conduct and all of the attendant circumstances of the transaction, as well. Heryford v. Davis, 1o2 U. S. 23S, 26 L.
ed. i6o (i88o) ; Gerow v. Costello, ii Colo. 56o, i9 Pac. so5 (z888) ; Rodgers
v. Bachman, iop Cal. S55, 42 Pac. 448 (895). The mere fact that the parties
inserted an express condition into the contract denying the legal effect of
the transaction will not avail to nullify their ruling intention as shown by the
entire arrangement Murch v. Wright,46 Ill. 487 (x868); Palmer v. Howard,
72 Cat 293, 13 Pac. 858 88).
Conditional sales, although the courts insist that they are entirely lawful, Zuchtman v. Roberts, iop Mass. 53 (1871); Sanders v. Keber, 38 Ohio
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St. (1876); Mosely v. Shattuck, 43 Iowa 543 (i876) are not looked upon

with much favor, because of their potential possibility of injuring innocent
purchasers and encumbrancers of the vendee. Schweitzer v. Tracy, 76 IIl.
345 (x875); Stadtfield v. Huntsman, 92 Pa. 53 (1879); Singer Mfg. Co. v.
In Pennsylvania a reservation
Smith, 4o S. C. 529, i9 S. E. 132 (x893).
of title in a contract under which goods are delivered to the vendee is void
as against the creditors of the person in possession, if the contract is not
essentially one of a bailment. Morgan Electric Company v.Brown, 193 Pa.
351, 44 At. 459 (1899) ; In re Tice, 139 Fed. 52 (1905) ; 35 Cyc. 67. Again,
in Texas, by statute, a reservation of title to secure the payment of the purchase price is void and the transaction is treated not as conditional, but as
an absolute one, with a chattel mortgage in the vendor. Crews v. Harlan,
99 TeM. 9, 8I S. W. 6s6 (sgoS).
This tendency to frown on conditional sales and regard them as transactions in which title passes immediately to the vendee, is clearly exhibited
by the principal case. The purpose of this is no doubt to protect innocent
purchasers and creditors of the vendee and as such is worthy, but the
protection should not be so far extended, it is submitted, as to interfere
with the rights of the vendor and vendee to specify the terms of their
contract as they wish.
STATUTE OF LimXTATONs--WAvER.-The maker by a provision in a note
waived all benefits of the statute of limitations. . Held: the waiver Is void
since it is for an indefinite time. First Nat. Bank v. Mock 2o3 Pae. p

(Colo. 192).

The courts which hold waivers of statutes of limitations for an indefinite
time void do so upon the assumption that such statutes are for the peace and
welfare of society; and so attempts to disregard them are against public policy
like attempts to avoid the usury statutes. Crane et oL v. French, 38 Miss.
5o3 (x86o) ; Kellog v. Dickinson, x47 Mass. 432, 18 -N. B. 223 (x888) ; Wright
v. Gardner, 98 Ky. 454, 35 S. W. 1116 (z895). "Itwould be flying in the face
of the statute." Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. United States Hotel Co., u4 N. Y. S.
476 (1913). On the other hand some courts interpret limitation statutes to
be purely for the benefit and repose of individuals and not to secure objects
of policy or morals. Accordingly, thy declare that a person may be estopped
for all time from availing himself of such a personal defense just as he may
fail to plead it at any particular suit. Quick v. Corlies, 39 N. J. L. II (1876);
Mani2 v. Cooper, 2 App. Cas. 226 (D.C. x894); State Trust Co. v. Sheldon,
68 Vt. 259, 35 At. I7,7(1895). Most courts, however, though enforcing the
waiver through estoppel limit the term of the estoppel. Thus indefinitewaivers made after the statute has begun running against the obligation will
estop the obligor only for the length of the statutory period counted as from
the date of waiver. Armstrong v. Levan, iog Pa. 177, 1 AtL 204 (1885);
Joyner v. Massey, 97 N. C. 148, i S. E. 7o2 (1887) ; Wells, Fargo v. Enright,
127 Cal. 675; 6o Pac. 439 (igoo). Where the promise to waive is contemporaneous with the creation of the obligation it was held in Pennsylvania
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that the statutory period during which the obligation could be sued upon
was merely doubled. Hoffman v. Fisher, 2 Weekly Notes Cases i57 (Pa.

1875).
The view taken in the principal case that an indefinite waiver is void
appears to be.the better one. limitation statutes prevent stale claims which
tend to encourage perjury and fraud; furthermore stale claims interfere with
the repose of society. Union Central Life Ins. Co. v. Spinks, zigKy. 26!,
86 S. W. 615 (i9o4). The theory of estoppel as used by courts enforcing
the waiver is difficult to support. A person can only be estopped by his
representations as to existing facts and not by his promise to do something
in the future. Shapely v. Abbott, 42 N. Y. 449 (i87o). The fact that it is
optional with a person to plead a defense is no argument for upholding a
contract by which he hinds himself forever not to plead it. Crane v. French,
-upra.
It is intimated in the principal decision that, if the waiver had not been
indefinite but for a limited time, it might have been enforced. It is submitted that if it is contrary to public policy to waive the statute indefinitely
it is so when it is waived for any length of time. In either case the statute is
avoided.
THan PAry BENEFICIARY Co~raAcs-AsssN- or BENEcAaY NEcasPaoussoe's tIszsiu,.-The corporation in which the
defendant is a stockholder assumed all the obligations of its predecessor and
a few months later gave the note sued on to the creditor of the predecessor, who indorsed it to the plaintiff. If the defendant's liability were considered as accruing at the time of the assumption of the debt the statute had
run, but ih had not run if the period were computed from the date of the
note. The defendant pleaded the statute of limitations. Held: There was no
liability on the part of the defendant to the creditor until the note was given
and accepted since the beneficiary did not accede to the contract before that
time. More v. Hutchinson, 2o3 Pac. 97 (CaL 1922).
The decision in the principal case, that an overt act of acceptance is
necessary to create the promisors liability, finds support in quite a few
jurisdictions. Ramsdale v. Horton, 3 Pa. 330 (z&46); Straghorn 4. Webb.
2 N. C. 99 (1855) ; In re Isaacs et al.; 13 Fed. Cases 148 (Col. 1873) ; Blake
v. Atlantic National Bank, 33 R. 1.464,'82 Atl. 225 (1912). However, some
courts take a middle ground, in that, although they require an assent by
the third party, they presume an acceptance in a "sole beneficiary" contract.
Williamson-Stewart Paper Company v. Seaman, 29 Ill. App. 68 (z887);
Waterman v. Morgan, 114 Ind. 237, 16 N. N. 59o (1898). On the other
hand, it has been held, as contended for by the dissenting justice in the
instant case, that "the law operates upon the acts of the parties, creates the
duty, establishes the privity and implies the promise and obligation on
which the contract is grounded" so that no acceptance is necessary. Tweedale v. Tweedale, z16 Wis. 5ij, 93 N. W. 44o (19o3); Washer v. Independent Mining & Development Company, 142 Cal. 702, 76 Pac. 6 S (z904);
Fanning v. Murphy, 126 Wis. 538 In5 N. W. 1o56 (sgo6).
sARY To EsrAnisn
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It seems that the majority of American jurisdictons favor the view
that the immediate parties to a third party beneficiary contract may rescn
at any time before the third party assents, Trimble v. Strother, 25 Ohio St. 378
(1874); Gilbert v. Sanderson, 56 Iowa 349 (188); People's Bank & Trust
Company v. Weidinger, 73 N. J. L 433, 64 AlL 179 (igo6) ; however, there Is
respectable authority to the contrary. Henderson v. McDonald et aL, 84 Ind.
149 (1882) ; Bay v. Williams, 112 11. 91 (1884) ; Starbird e aL. v. Cranston, 24
Colo. 2o, 48 Pac. 652 (1897). It is submitted that if the courts holding the
majority view were confronted with the issue presented in the principal case
they would be compelled to decide that assent is necessary to establish the
obligation while those holding the minority view would come to the opposite
conclusion.
The decision of the principal case is consistent with the ordinary rules
The majority view was based on the ground that 'a
governing contracts.
contract for the benefit of a third person, like any other contract, requires an
acceptance; and until such acceptance is manifested in some manner no rights
creating a corresponding liability in favor of such party can arise." It therefore seems that as far as the third person is concerned the transaction amounts
to a mere offer.
RrtuaN oy
SutmiTro To TRZ JuaY Ay=rui
Ti
-A-INaocAToa.s
TnEm Vzamcr.-The court submitted several questions to the jury, on the return of their verdict, as to the grounds on which they predicated it. Held:
This practice is unnecessary and objectionable. Riley v. O'Connell, us6 AitL

89 (Conn. i92).
In many states statutes provide that it is mandatory on the court to submit
interrogatories to the jury when it is -requested by one of the parties, Benton
v. St. Louis & San Francisco Railway Co, 25 Mo. App. z55 (x887); Bower
ef al. v. Bower et aL, t42 Ind. 194, 4z N. E. 523 (189); Larson v. Leonardt,
8 Cal. App. 226, 96 Pac. 395 (i9o8); while in other states it is discretionary
with the court. For a full discussion of this, see Clementson's Special Verdict,. C. 3.However in the New England states, especially, in the absence of a
statute the court may at its discretion submit interrogatories to the jury before they go out. Walker v. Sawyer, 13 N. H. 191 (1842); Cullum v. Cotwell, 8S Conn. 459, us AtL 789 (1912). It has been held that the consent of
both parties is necessary to give the court this po~ier, Walker v. Sawyer,
jupra, while in McMasters el aL v. The West Chester County Mutital Ins. Co.,
25 Wend. 379 (1841), this was done over the objection of one of the parties
and approved of on appeal.
The practice of the court to interrogate the jury, on the return of their
verdict, upon what they predicated it probably had its origin in Massachusetts.
Don"v. Fenno, 12 Pick. 520 (Mass. 1832). This practice was soon adopted in
Maine and New Hampshire. Smith v. Putney, z8 Me. 81 (84); Smith v.
Powers, 15 N. H. 546 (1844). In England, however, the power of the court
to require the jury to answer through their foreman, in what particular way
they found certain questions, is denied. Mayor of Devizes v. Clark, 3 Ad. &
EL 5o6 (Eng. 1835). It is surprising to note that a dklumn in a later Mam-
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chusetts case, Hannum et ux. v. The Inhabitants of Belchertown, 36 Mass. 31i
(1837); seems to be inconsistent with the general Massachusetts view on this
subject and quite consistent with the decision of the principal case: "The
secrecy of the deliberations and discussions of the jury and the exemption of
jurors from the liability of being questioned as to their motives and grounds
of action, are highly important to the freedom and independence of their decision
Such inquiries after the verdict has been returned are not subject to exception and are entirely discretionary with the court. Spurr. v. Inhabitants of
Shelburne, 131 Mass. 429 (1881). However, it is error for the court to ask
the jury questions and then prepare a verdict for them in open court to be
affirmed by them, for there a comparison of views is impracticable. Kenny
v. Habich et ol., 137 Mass. 421 (1884). It goes without saying, that in no
jurisdiction has either party the absolute right to have interrogatories submitted to the jury after their return of the verict. Burleson et al. v. Burleson
ct al., 28 Texas 383 (1866); Hairgrove v. Millington, 8 Kan. 480 (1871).
'There is no doubt but that trial by jury in civil cases is declining in public esteem and that this dissatisfaction is due in part, at least, to the fact that
the jurors do not abide by the rule so often repeated by Coke: "Ad qutrstiones
legis non respondet joratores," but on the contrary too frequently are swayed
by what they think the law ought to be and therefore their verdict does not
depend on the facts as found. It is submitted that a wider scope of the
court's power in preenting interrogatories to the jury would remedy this
misconduct.
In view of the fact that the practice resorted to in the instant case has
been followed in, at lrast, one other case in this state without objection, Frazier v. Harvey, 34 Conn. 469 (1867) ; it'is notable that the court in the principal
case refused to sanction it and especially since the practice of asking interro.
gatories, both before ;nd after verdict, found such favor in her sister states.
WoRKuEN'sCs

OMPENSATION-CAsuAL

EMPLoymENT-RrWULA

COURSE op

Bus1iNss.-The claimant a skilled mechanic, engaged in business for himself, was employed by X, operating an oil well, to repair an engine used to
run a pump. While waiting for an employee of X to transport him to his
own shop, where it was necessary to have. a cylinder rebored, claimant, for
some unknown reasop, stepped into an adjoining pumphouse, and was killed,
Held: The widow is not entitled to compensation, as the employment was casual and not in the regular course of X's business. Callihan v. Montgomery,
272Pa. 56 (392).
The English and most of the American compensation laws expressly exclude casual'employees from their protection. Harper on Workmen's Compensation; Sec. 114. The language of exclusion in the English act, "whose employment is of a casual nature" has been construed to refer to the kind of
service done by the employee rather than to the duration of service. Knight
v. Bucknill, 6 B. W. C. i6o (Eng. 1913). In Pennsylvania and many other
states, however, workmen are excluded whose "employment is casual in
character." This change of phraseology has narrowed the scope of such acts
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and made the exemption depend, not on the nature of the work performed.
but on the nature of the contract ol employment. In re Gaynor, 217 Mass. 86,
104 N. E. 339 (19r4).
Ordinarily, an employment is casual when it is for a single day, In re
Krug, =ao Mass. 29o, io7 N. E. 959 (i915); or by the hour; Op. Atty. Gen,
on Minn. Wk. Comp. Act, Bul. ii, p. 2o; but not where one is employed to do
a particular part of a service recurring somewhat regularly with the fair
expectation of the continuance for a reasonable time. Sabello v. Brazileiro,
86 N. J. L SoS, 9z AtI. io32 (1914). Workmen are engaged in "casual employment" when they are employed only "occasionally,. "irregularly" or "incidentally," as distinguished from those employed "regularly" and "continuously.!?
Chicago, etc. R. R. Co. v. Industrial Com., 2&4 IlL 573, 120 N. E. eo8 (i918).
Another test is whether or not the employment is for a limited aad temporary purpose. Western Union Tel. Co. v. Hickman, 248 Fed. 899 (C. C. A.
1918).
To prevent compensation in Pennsylvania, the employment must not
only be "casual in character," but "outside the regular course of the business of the employer." Article r, Sec. 1o4 of Compensation Act, P. L i915,
p. 736; Tarr v. Hecla Coal Co., 265 Pa. 519; io9 At. az4 (ig2o). Some
statutes use the above terms disjunctively. Holbrook v. Olympia Hotel Co.,
2oo Mich. 597, 166 N. .W. 876 (1918). In construing "regular course of business of the employer," the court in the principal case declared it to refer to
the normal operations which regularly constitute the business in question,
excluding incidental or occasional operations arising out of the transactions in
that business, such as, now and again, repairing the premises, appliances, or
machinery used therein. The decision seems'correct and in accord with the
law of those jurisdictions whose statutes are worded similarly.
WORKMEx'S COUPENsATixO-Docmur or INDEPENDPNT CONnAcroit NoT
APPacABI.m-The claimant, whose regular occupation was farming, agreed to
cut a large quantity of timber for the defendant company at a certain rate
per thousand feet. The company had a right to demand that the timber be
cut according to specifications, but had no control over the method or means
by which it was to be done. The claimant engaged his son to help him, paying him, himself. Held: The claimant was an "employee" within the meaning of the Workmen's Compensation Act. McDowell v. Duer, in N. W. 839
(Ind. App. i9n).
Independent contractors are not employees within the meaning of the
Compensation Acts in most jurisdictions. Anofsky v. Industrial Comm., 29o
IlL 521, 125 N. F- 286 (9gig); Connolly v. Industrial Accident Comm., z7S
Cal. 405, z6o Pac. 239 (19x6); Smith v. State Workmen's Insurance Fund, 262
Pa. 286 (918).
Generally speaking, an "independent contractor" is one who
exercises an independent employment and contracts to do a piece of work according to his own method, without being subject to the control of the employer, save as to the results of his work. Honnold on Workmen's Compensation, Vol. z, Sec. 66. The test of the relationship of employer and em-
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ployee is the right to the general control. It is not the fact of actual interference with the control, but the right to interfere, that makes the difference
between an Independent Contractor and a servant or agent. Tuttle v. EmburyMartin Lumber Co., z92 Mich. 38s, 158 N. W. 875 (xgx6). In the principal
case the court declares that the doctrine of "independent contractor" has no
place in the law of workmen's compensation and should be eliminated in considering whether or not the relationship of employer and employee exists.
This is opposed to the great weight of authority; Pennsylvania, in particutar, laying great stress on the element of "control." Kelly v. DeL, Lacka. &
W. R. R., 2-o Pa. 426, 113 AtL 419 (ig2r). In the opinion of the court, the
contract was one merely for services, and since claimant never held himself
out as a contractor in the line of work he was doing for the defendant company, it was reasonable to consider him as a workman within the meaning of
the act. While the court seems justified in departing froin the stricter rule
followed in most states, and in construing the word "employee" liberally, its
decision in the principal case seems erroneous. The fact that it was a contract to do a definite amount of work, that claimant was not paid wages, that
he had the right to employ helpers, that lie used his own tools, and had the
control over the manner and means by which the cutting was to be done all
show that the contract was not for "services," and therefore, not within the

Compensation Laws

